Meeting our national infrastructure challenges will require that we answer the question posed by the National Academy of Engineering: "How can we make our processes more effective, more quality conscious, more flexible, simpler, and less expensive?" In this paper, we share one approach to identify solutions meeting the "simpler" characteristic of NAE's question. Through an interdisciplinary literature review, we characterize "elegant" solutions, those which meet user needs with minimal complexity. While elegance can appear simple in hindsight, it actually represents a deeper understanding of the real problem. As with other project outcomes, elegance is dependent on infrastructure project delivery processes: an owner who contracts with a designer to provide a reduction in traffic is encouraging a more elegant solution than an owner who specifies that the designer must add an additional lane. Behavioral scientists have developed choice architecture theory, which is being applied to improve decision processes in fields from medicine to law to finance. We believe choice architecture could also be used to arrange infrastructure delivery processes to encourage elegance. We describe our reasoning by connecting behavioral science theory and common infrastructure project delivery scenarios. We hope this paper begins a discussion to identify and motivate future research in this area.
so efficiently. For example, a home designed with a mechanical air conditioning system likely meets user needs for space and comfort at a competitive cost. However, a passive house design, with features like superior insulation, south facing windows, and extended overhangs, may be able to satisfy these same needs more efficiently by reducing operation costs without increasing production costs.
Elegant solutions go beyond symptoms to fix root causes (Madni, 2012) . Doing so requires persistence, as shown in Figure 1 . Initial simple solutions may not meet user needs. Complexity is added to sufficiently meet these user needs, but elegant solutions require pushing beyond this point to meet needs with less complexity (Madni, 2012; May, 2009; Siegel & Etzkorn, 2013) . Consider an example where workers that connect concrete slabs constantly faced drill bits breaking regardless of their strength (Madni, 2012) . Engineers only solved the problem after looking beyond the symptom (broken drill bits) to the root problem (connecting the concrete slabs). Their resulting solution was to redesign the slabs as interlocking pieces; thereby eliminating the need for drilled holes altogether.
Subtraction that adds value is a challenging but necessary component in pursuit of elegance (May, 2009) . The rewards are substantial however, which is one reason why companies including Toyota, Google, Trader Joe's, and ING Direct emphasize subtraction in various forms (Siegel & Etzkorn, 2013 ).
An infrastructure example of subtraction that adds value is when architects reduce office lighting to improve productivity. Because office workers spend the majority of their time looking at backlit computer screens, reducing lighting decreases the glare, which in turn decreases headaches (Loftness, 2013) . Another example of subtraction that adds value is the removal of traffic lights leading to fewer accidents and more efficient traffic flow as drivers pay closer attention and reduce speeds (May, 2009) . The Dutch town of Drachten removed all forms of traffic regulation in the De Kaden intersection, this included traffic lights, street signs, roadway markings and curbs, citing when drivers feel uncertain about right-of-ways they reduce speeds to better accommodate pedestrians (Vanderbilt, 2008) .
PROBLEM: Elegance is difficult to achieve
Elegance in infrastructure is rare. Unintentional rewards for complexity, whether through contract structures or social norms, can inhibit elegance in infrastructure projects. Military contracts, for example, do not allow engineering design costs to exceed six percent of total construction costs (Niece, 2005) . Design firms subject to this well-intentioned rule are dis-incentivized to strive for a less expensive, elegant, construction solution. Similarly, fixed fee contracts pay designers to review drawings and technical specifications on an hourly basis. When designs are complex, the designer can more easily justify their hours spent (Brydges, n.d.) . Elegant designs, on the other hand, can appear intuitive or simple, making it more difficult for the designer to illustrate just how much time was spent to overcome complexity and arrive at elegance.
Social norms can also work against elegance since we tend to prefer visible improvements ("Sunk infrastructure," 2007; Wald, 2007) . Compared with projects that have subtracted towards invisible elegance, complex and visible projects are more conducive to ribbon cutting ceremonies, industry awards, magazine feature articles and the like. When attempting to reduce home energy use, buying a new refrigerator is often more convenient than adding attic insulation, which is more cost effective and saves more energy. Similarly, funds allocated for building code enforcement are sometimes redirected toward other activities more visible to taxpayers (Eisenberg & Persram, 2009) .
Psychological barriers to value-adding subtraction may also make elegant solutions less likely. Brain scans, called fMRIs, measure blood flow of activated neurons and show brain activity in different regions when we add and when we subtract. Moreover, subtraction takes longer for the brain to process and produces lower degrees of accuracy (Gonzalez, Dana, Koshino, & Just, 2005; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1993; Yi-Rong et al., 2011) . Studies of financial gains and losses show that gains generate activity in the analytic section of the brain whereas losses generate processing between the emotional and analytic sections (Martino, Kumaran, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006) . This finding suggests that subtraction is more difficult for our brains. Possible barriers to subtractive elegance go beyond the fMRI studies and include well-established cognitive biases such as loss aversion, comparison friction, sunk cost, myopia, uncertainty. These biases and some infrastructure examples are described in more detail below.
Loss Aversion
Khaneman and Tversky's (1979) concept of loss aversion shows that we generally prefer not losing something to winning the exact same thing. In other words, loss provokes greater degrees of discomfort than a win provides satisfaction. Even at 50/50 odds, to risk overcoming initial loss often requires the potential win to be roughly twice as great (Benartzi & Thaler, 1993) 1 . Loss aversion helps explain why we keep a shirt we do not wear anymore or why we avoid risky investments that project to pay more over time.
Loss aversion nearly prevented the elegant infrastructure project, Falls Park, from transforming downtown Greenville, SC. City officials were met with heavy opposition in 2001 when they proposed deconstructing a six-lane bridge and building a park and pedestrian bridge in its place. Even local school children signed petitions against the mayor's plan (Hekter & Fletcher, 2011) . One reason for the resistance was likely that the potential loss of the known six-lane bridge was felt more deeply than the unknown gain of the walking bridge and park.
Comparison Friction
We often make decisions by comparing differences between options. But when information is lacking, so is our decision-making. The auto industry uses one example of reducing comparison friction. The fuel economy label used to show city and highway mileage per gallon, but now presents annual fuel cost over five years against the fuel cost of the average vehicle. This provides more information to the consumer and improves their ability to pick the most beneficial option (Larrick & Soll, 2008 ).
For example, energy utility customers receive little information about energy portfolio options or CO2 emission levels such as renewable versus non-renewable energy sources. This lack of information prevents customers from choosing an elegant solution (Todd & Houde, 2011) . Opower, a utility consultant company, is now providing some customers with a consumption report comparing their usage to the average usage of customer homes.
Sunk Cost
People become emotionally invested in money already spent and continue to pay regardless of current costs, benefits, or losses (Arkes & Blumer, 1985) . This sunk cost thinking can lead to continually trying to re-coop the initial investment (Thaler, 1980) . A familiar example is continuing to watch a bad movie simply because the ticket is already paid for (Arkes & Blumer, 1985) .
Sunk cost in complex infrastructure is a barrier to choosing elegant future solutions. The Columbia River Crossing (CRC) highway design and proposal cost Oregon and Washington taxpayers $140 million. This was relatively low in comparison to the $3.1-3.5 billion estimated for construction. When advocates against the proposal pleaded for a more elegant multi-modal design, government officials cited the sunk cost in the original proposal as reason construction needed to proceed (Manvel, 2011) .
Myopia
Myopia is characterized by our desire for immediate gratification and can lead decision-making that does not give sufficient weight to future outcomes (Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2005) . In experiments where subjects could choose between receiving $100 immediately or $120 in one month, the majority chose the immediate $100 (Buonomano, 2012) . Shifting short-term decisions to long-term ones can reduce myopic influences. Experimental subjects asked to choose between $100 in 12 months or $120 in 13 months more often chose to wait an extra month for the $120 (Buonomano, 2012) . Large field studies show that changing these settings, from current to future outcomes, can increase individuals' savings rates for retirement plans (Thaler & Benartzi, 2004) .
Myopia may be a contributing influence in non-elegant decisions to reduce construction costs at the expensive of future operation and maintenance costs (Chalifoux, 2006) . In residential construction, the upfront costs of "green" homes are cited as a purchasing barrier ("Green homeowner," n.d.). Offsetting initial costs or delaying costs over time could help reduce myopia.
Uncertainty
When decisions involve risk but lack a numerical probability, we tend to assign our own probability based on our experience. Prior experience leads to underestimating risk and no experience leads to overestimating (Heath & Tversky, 1991) . The amount of detail we have about each decision option can also influence our perception of probability. All else being equal, the more information we have, the more confident we become about the outcome (Fox & Tversky, 1998) .
Uncertainty could be a contributing factor in a lack of adoption of unfamiliar, but elegant and sustainable infrastructure technologies, such as decentralized wastewater systems. Stakeholder groups, such as building code officials, are less likely to approve systems they have no previous experience inspecting (Eisenberg & Persram, 2009 ). An economic sociology study of the construction industry supports this theory of uncertainty finding a reluctance to depart from industry standards and norms (Beamish & Biggart, 2010) .
Choice Architecture -overcoming the barriers to subtraction
One approach to overcoming the barriers to elegance may lie in choice architecture. The basic idea of choice architecture is that differences in the way decisions are posed can be used to help decision makers. Choice architecture acknowledges the multitude of ways in which information can be presented to decision makers, and that the presentation inevitably influences the decisions (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) . Just as there is no "neutral" building structure that does not influence how people navigate within it, there is also no neutral choice architecture; some options are presented first, attributes are or are not presented, and these factors influence decisions. How a choice is presented affects the reasoning process even when two methods of posing a decision are formally equivalent, because each may give rise to different psychological processes including the cognitive biases mentioned in the previous section.
Choice architecture is being applied to improve decision processes in fields ranging from medicine to law to finance (Thaler & Sunstein, 2008) . Considering choice architecture in civil engineering could help arrange infrastructure delivery processes to encourage elegance. The following sections describe some core choice architecture concepts: risk framing, defaults, partitioning options, and goals as reference points 2 . Each concept is illustrated with examples of how each are applicable to infrastructure project delivery to encourage subtractive elegant solutions. 
Risk Framing
Risk framing describes outcomes of choices with varying levels of risk in different ways. In their Asian disease problem, which frames risk as percent loss or gain, Khaneman and Tversky (1984) were able to induce the risky choice when outcomes were negatively framed, in terms of lives lost. Conversely, positively framed outcomes (lives saved) prompted the certain choice. Subsequent research shows both experts and laypeople are susceptible to risk framing.
Applying risk framing to overcome loss aversions, we use the Greenville, SC bridge example described earlier. We could expect more support for the argument, "If we do not demolish the bridge and build a park we could lose $50 million in economic development," than the same argument framed as "if we demolish the bridge and build a park we could gain $50 million in economic development." If the public views demolishing the bridge as the risky choice, presenting the loss option provides the best chance for selecting this choice.
Defaults
Setting a default condition imposes a decision when an individual fails to make one. In the case of organ donation, setting the correct default can save lives (Johnson & Goldstein, 2003) . European countries using opt-out defaults report ten times the participation rates as countries with opt-in defaults.
Those structuring decisions in infrastructure delivery process may be unaware of the default influence. They may unintentionally create a process that leads to complex infrastructure rather than an elegant one by setting the wrong default. If the psychological barrier of comparison friction leads to no decision, the default can make all the difference. For example, most electricity suppliers list the nonrenewable provider as the default option and do not provide enough information for the customer willing to make a change. However, when a more sustainable renewable energy source is the default, most consumers select that option and that choice is maintained (Pichert & Katsikopoulos, 2008) .
Partitioning of options
Partitioning decisions, both in groups and over time, can reduce choice overload and influence decision weighting. A new car buyer may experience decision partitions as options arranged within exterior, interior, and add-on packages and review one package at a time. Each choice within the given partition receives the same amount of time and weight (Levav, Heitmann, Herrmann, & Iyengar, 2010) . Isolation rather than partitioning causes the opposite affect, where the isolated choice is perceived significant and is given more time and weight during the decisionmaking process (Martin & Norton, 2009) .
Setting an example of isolating choices in selection of transportation options, the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) initiated "Summer Streets," an event opening city streets to pedestrians and bicyclists for one day a month (Khawarzad, 2011) . By isolating options, even for a short period of time, the DOT hopes to influence an elegant transportation option. Bogota, Colombia's event, Ciclovia, attracts 1.8 million people every week, and city officials believe the event will eventually become the norm and plan to close the roads more frequently or even permanently (Eckerson, 2007) 
Goals as reference points
A reference point is the neutral between loss and gain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981) . When comparing outcomes, goals can serve as references. Highly-set goals prompt greater motivation to achieve the neutral, acting loss averse (Heath, Larrick, & Wu, 1999) . That motivation is not transferable to achieving above the goal.
Policy makers and industry groups have established acknowledgements for meeting certain goals in the form of certifications and rating systems (e.g.,EnergyStar, LEED). However these ratings may inadvertently set goals too low, thus setting low motivation (Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Strack, Martin, & Schwarz, 1988 ) that discourages the innovation needed to achieve elegant solutions (Klotz, Mack, Klapthor, Tunstall, & Harrison, 2010) . Shifting the reference point higher would prompt greater innovation to get back to neutral.
CONCLUSION: Future research needs
We propose choice architecture as a tool to achieve elegant infrastructure solutions. While our recommendation is supported by research from behavioral science labs, much work is needed to connect these findings to real-world infrastructure delivery processes.
A complete picture will not emerge if we evaluate behavioral influences on a single stakeholder group, since infrastructure development involves a diverse array of stakeholders (e.g., investors, planners, contractors, and regulatory agencies). All are prominently involved in infrastructure development decisions. As such, these decisions are subject to the varying constraints, goals, and resources of all of these stakeholders, who have different schedules, agendas, mandates, budget cycles, and sources of funding. Identifying the highest-impact decisions and their determinants at individual, organizational, and societal levels are primary research needs.
We also recognize that not all choice architecture interventions will produce infrastructure outcomes leading to elegant solutions, but we need research to identify which interventions are most plausible for adoption by various stakeholder groups. This will include isolating which factors of the interventions cause them to be less or more likely to be adopted. This will require various mix-method approaches. We can test experimental tasks in the classroom on stakeholders that are represented in student populations (e.g. future engineers, construction professionals, end-users of our infrastructure systems). For stakeholder groups that are less numerous but just as influential (e.g., elected officials, master planners), this may require qualitative methods, like case studies that include interviews and site visits.
Part of the job of infrastructure project delivery professionals is to help project stakeholders make decisions that are in their own best interest. This is precisely the role of choice architecture. We hope this paper starts a discussion that leads to further research, greater use of choice architecture in infrastructure project delivery and, accordingly, to more elegant solutions.
